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Devolution of political power is constantly on the political 
agenda in both Italy and Spain. Fiscal policy in these countries 
has granted specific privileges to some regions. Valle 
d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste (VdA) and País Vasco/Euskadi (PV) 
have an extensive say over spending decisions, and receive 
nearly all regional tax revenues. Although both VdA and PV 
are among the richest regions in each country, both are net 
beneficiaries of the fiscal equalisation system. This preferential 
treatment is the outcome of a fiscal system with limits on 
taxing power and debt issuance, and is meant as a 
compensation for the lack of autonomy. It so prevents calls 
for more fiscal autonomy, or even outright secession. The 
economic effects of this asymmetric federalism are negative. 
Although partial equalisation reduces excessive redistribution 
built in the fiscal equalisation system, more autonomy could 
pay off with more efficient government. Asymmetric 
federalism moreover creates a political impasse in the 
negotiation of a more efficient tax system and financing 
arrangement. 
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Countries that used to be highly centralised like Italy and Spain have made many steps in 
the devolution of powers to regional government. Decentralisation is permanently at the 
centre of the political debate. A peculiar feature of this gradual decentralisation process in 
both countries is the differentiation of the basic financing system over different regions. 
Some regions have received specific powers in spending, or in the financing of the regional 
budget. For some, this differentiation has usually been justified by geographical or 
economic circumstances. Isolated or poor regions have been attributed more autonomy. 
For others, a century-long history of fiscal autonomy – based also on linguistic and cultural 
diversity – has been the reason for granting additional spending and tax powers. 
 
In this paper, we examine the reasons for such a preferential treatment of rich regions, and 
its economic consequences. We compare the financing system of an Italian region with a 
special status, Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste (hereafter, VdA), and the Spanish region of 
País Vasco/Euskadi (hereafter, PV). At present, VdA has an almost complete say over its 
spending. In contrast to the ‘ordinary’ Italy regions, it also receives nearly all tax revenues 
collected on its territory.
1 For PV, autonomy is arguably even stronger as it is entirely in 
command over spending. PV is also the only region to collect all tax revenues. In this 
‘foral’ system – also called the ‘Concierto Economico’ – PV collects all taxes, and 
afterwards compensates the central government for services delivered on its territory.
2 
These special arrangements result in net benefits for both regions, with financial resources 
per inhabitant above those of other regions. Despite being among the richest regions, both 
get a lot of supplementary financing and are nearly exempt from contributing to solidarity 
mechanisms with poorer regions in the country. 
 
The origin of this preferential treatment is the difficulty for the central government in 
Rome and Madrid to develop a fiscal arrangement that fully develops fiscal autonomy over 
the entire country (Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 2007; Ambrosanio and Bordignon, 2008). 
Despite the devolution of spending and tax powers, the system is still characterised by tight 
controls on tax autonomy and the issuance of public debt. This implies that both regions 
formally receive close to 100 per cent of all tax revenues, but that their autonomy to decide 
                                                 
1 Similar powers are granted also to the other 'autonomous' regions (Sicily, Sardinia and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia) and 
provinces (Bolzano/Bozen and Trento) with special statute. 
2 The only other region with a similar system is Navarra. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 5 
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on tax revenues – as in other regions – is de facto quite limited. In VdA, the main source of 
revenues is shared taxes, on which the regional government has limited discretion to set 
exceptions. VdA can only revise its own budget if the central government unilaterally 
decides to change tax rates or bases. Moreover, the Italian Stability Pact imposes further 
restrictions on regional debt. In PV, unilateral tax decisions are possible, yet its 
discretionary power is implicitly curtailed by rules in the Concierto Economico that 
prohibit tax measures that create competitive distortions in the Spanish internal market. In 
addition, the Fiscal Policy Council strictly controls the issuance of new debt. 
 
Limits on tax and spending powers, or on public debt, may be necessary to equalize fiscal 
capacity and control the sustainability of public finances across the country. However, such 
rules are not adequate for VdA or PV that could afford lower taxes or higher levels of 
public spending without incurring higher debt. Tax competition would allow both regions 
to attract firms and citizens with lower taxes or better public services. VdA or PV lose 
economically under this inflexible fiscal arrangement. The generosity of the fiscal 
arrangement is a compensation to both regions for the lack of fiscal federalism in the 
current arrangement, and so prevents calls for more fiscal autonomy, or even outright 
secession (Le Breton and Weber, 2003). The current situation that treats regions differently 
is a political equilibrium where on the one hand, the calls of rich regions for more 
autonomy are limited and do not spark conflict, and on the other hand, poorer regions or 
the central government do not question the existing privileged financing status of VdA and 
PV. It is a compromise between the difficulties to implement fiscal federalism in the entire 
country, due to economic and institutional differences, and the necessity for some regions 
to develop real tax and spending powers. 
 
The underlying conflict between equity and efficiency is not particular to Spain or Italy. 
But the asymmetry in financing exacerbates these problems (Keating, 1998, 1999). 
Differentiating spending and tax powers across regions creates economic inefficiencies. 
Although the partial equalisation of fiscal capacity under asymmetric federalism might 
reduce an excessive redistribution built in the fiscal equalisation system (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980), and so provide incentives for regions to improve economic management, 
full autonomy would allow all regions to reap the (economic) benefits of decentralisation. 
In VdA or PV, limited autonomy creates economic losses due to the inefficiently high tax 
and spending levels, and a suboptimally low level of debt. It keeps both regions on a Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 6 
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Federalism  à la carte not only creates economic losses, but persistent distortions in 
regional decision making create rent seeking behaviour, and a political deadlock on 
possible reforms. Modifications of the financing arrangement are determined by the 
political clout of each region. VdA, with a small population and just one deputy and 
senator in the Italian parliament cannot put sufficient political power at the central level to 
contain decisions on taxation. In contrast, political parties of PV are often crucial for 
majorities of the central government in the Spanish Parliament. This has made a rather 
small region punch above its political weight, and has resulted in the approval of additional 
financing for PV. Reform measures in Italy and Spain over the last decade have aimed at 
matching higher spending autonomy with increased taxing power for the ordinary regions 
and Comunidades Autonomas (CCAA). But it has not brought substantial changes to the 
special arrangements of VdA and PV. Asymmetric federalism risks creating a political 
stalemate that makes it impossible to set further steps in devolution in an economically 
sensible way. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we compare the development of fiscal 
arrangements in VdA and PV. We then assess in section 3 the de facto degree of autonomy 
in spending and taxes both regions have. We discuss the financing arrangement, and the 
reasons for the limited use of tax autonomy in section 4. The final section summarises, and 
discusses implications for further steps in fiscal federalism. 
 
2. The financing arrangement 
 
2.1. Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste (Aosta Valley) 
. 
The 1946 Italian Constitution recognizes the existence of five cases of special regional 
autonomy within the unitary Republic. The reason of this particular attention resides in the 
historical and cultural differences that characterized these regions and in the will of 
preserving ethnic-linguistic minorities, as explicitly reported in article 116 of the 
                                                 
3 Empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and economic growth is mixed, yet suggests that 
economic benefits are not a panacea but depend on the implementation of devolution (Thornton, 2007).  Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 7 
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Constitution.
4 This distinctive treatment has been maintained – and strengthened, albeit 
only formally – during the reform of the Constitution in 2001. 
 
The academic literature has not given particular attention to the case of VdA, although it 
presents some interesting peculiarities, both from legal and economic points of view. The 
autonomy of the smallest Italian region finds its roots back in the Middle Ages under the 
Savoy rule, and reflected the linguistic and judicial specificity of the valdôtains
5. In VdA, in 
fact, the enforced law derived mainly from habits and customs, although being far from a 
proper common law system.
6 The autonomy guaranteed by the Savoy kings assured wide 
self-government powers also on fiscal and financial issues. This system would survive, with 
minor changes until the Fascist regime abolished it completely. 
 
In 1946, the Italian Constitution restored with article 116 the autonomy of VdA. The same 
article also established the conditions of autonomy, in particular on administrative 
functions. The Constitution did not regulate the necessary financial resources to exercise 
those functions for any region. Fiscal autonomy is to be found in the Statute of the Region 
itself, introduced with Constitutional law n. 4 on February 26
th 1948.
7 Two particular 
articles of this Statute play a fundamental role in regulating the structure of local public 
finances. First, article 12 introduces bilateral agreements between the central government 
and the regional administration, with the aim of assigning to VdA a percentage of the fiscal 
revenues of the central government, although guaranteeing also the possibility of 
introducing  entrate proprie, i.e. regional taxes set by the regional government.
8 VdA's 
regional government has never used this possibility to levy own taxes. Second, article 13 
rules the attribution of fiscal assessment powers to the regional government. These powers, 
however, merely concern the collaboration with the central administration’s tax offices 
deployed on the territory of the region. Tax collection powers are not even mentioned in the 
Statute and, therefore, remain entirely under the control of the central administration. The 
fiscal and financial prerogatives of VdA in the Regional Statute can be defined as a fiscal 
                                                 
4 “Il Friuli Venezia Giulia, la Sardegna, la Sicilia, il Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol e la Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste 
dispongono di forme e condizioni particolari di autonomia, secondo i rispettivi statuti speciali adottati con legge 
costituzionale.” 
5 In VdA, the languages in use are Italian, French and Arpitan (a franco-provençal’s patois typical of western Alps). 
6 The codification of local laws took place only in 1588, with the publication of the so-called Coutumier du Val d'Aoste 
(Janin, 1969). 
7 And in particular, two titles of the Statute: Title III (Finanze, demanio e patrimonio)(in articles 5 to 13) and IV (zona 
Franca)(article 14). 
8 “ Oltre al gettito delle entrate proprie della Valle, sarà dallo Stato, sentito il Consiglio della Valle, attribuita alla stessa 
una quota dei tributi erariali.” Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 8 
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system of derivate finance (finanza derivata), in which all resources derive from decisions, 
sometimes concerted, of the central government, with no real fiscal power for the regional 
administration. 
 
Several State laws have implemented the content of the Statute. The following are the most 
relevant:  
1. no. 1179, November 29
th, 1955; 
2. no. 1065, December 6
th, 1971 (later modified by Decree no. 638, October 16
th, 1972); 
3. no. 690, November 26
th, 1982, currently in force. 
These laws give content to the general stipulations of the Statute. The system adopted by 
the Italian State and the VdA, under the third Title of the Regional Statute, is based on the 
compartecipazione (share) of fiscal revenues collected on the territory of the region. The 
method has been modified substantially from the content of the last paragraph of article 12 
of the Regional Statute
9 and it is based on a partition of all fiscal revenues collected on the 
territory of VdA on the base of a mix of both fixed and variable percentages. Initially (law 
no. 1179/55), the variable portion was attributed as a percentage of the imposta di ricchezza 
mobile, but created several legal arguments between the State and the Region because of its 
complexity. Basically, Rome could unilaterally set – within some pre-established limits – 
the percentage to attribute to VdA. By opening or closing the tap of finance according to the 
specific needs of the Italian State and depending on its political relations with the regional 
administration, Rome could use these as a levy in its negotiations. Moreover, these so-
called tap policies
10 caused great instability in the regional budget. The modification of the 
law (no. 1065/71) attributed 90 per cent of all taxes and levies. This innovation guaranteed 
a greater stability of the financial resources, but did not introduce new income for VdA. 
Although a transitory measure, this solution was extended until the law no. 690/81 entered 
into force. Since the 1981 law did not introduce any particular fiscal innovation, it still is 
the current regulating act of the financial system of VdA. The law confirmed the partition of 
90 per cent of most taxes and levies in favour of VdA.
11 Article 1 of the law details he 
various groups of sources VdA can obtain its financial resources from.
12 The most 
significant source remains the share of state taxes and levy collected on the territory of the 
                                                 
9 “Lo Stato, inoltre, cede a favore della Valle i nove decimi del canone annuale percepito a norma di legge per le 
concessioni di derivazioni a scopo idroelettrico.” 
10 Translated: politiche del rubinetto (Brosio and Revelli, 2000). 
11 Except that for years 1982 and 1983 when, due to harsh political contrasts between the regional and the central 
administration, the percentage was cut to 70 per cent. 
12 Own taxes, surcharges on state taxes and levies, share of state taxes and levies, administrative financial acts – such as 
the sell or rent of goods of regional property – and contribution of the state. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 9 
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Region. The legislator has also listed (articles 2, 3 and 4) the taxes and the levies whose 90 
per cent is devolved to the regional administration. Although the law cannot be unilaterally 
modified by the Italian Parliament nor the Council of Aosta Valley, but only after the 
approval of a joint committee composed by members appointed by both assemblies, the 
central government still keeps discretionary power over tax rates and bases. It so controls 
the main bases for regional taxation, such as taxes on economic activity (IRAP), personal 
income (IRPEF) and residence (ICI). VdA can only decide marginally on the levied rates 
and on regional surtaxes, among the limits established by State laws. In November 2010, 
the Regional administration and the Italian government reached an agreement to revise the 
sharing agreement in order to compensate VdA for the progressive reduction of VAT on 
imports. 
 
2.2. El País Vasco/Euskadi
13 
 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 has started a process of progressive decentralization in 
favour of the Comunidades Autonomas (CCAA) (Lopez Aguilar, 1999), also in fiscal 
matters. This decentralisation has created two distinct groups of CCAA: 
1.  CCAA under the common (or general) regime; 
2.  CCAA under the foral regime. 
All the CCAA but País Vasco/Euskadi and Navarra belong to the former group.
14 PV and 
Navarra’s fiscal and financial relationships with the Spanish government are regulated 
according to the rules of a traditional system of Concierto Economico and  Convenio 
Economico respectively.
15 The legal justification for this distinct treatment of both regions 
lies in the First Additional Disposition of the Constitution which safeguards and respects 
the historical rights of foral territories. 
 
As in the case of VdA, Basque financial autonomy has its roots in the Middle Ages. During 
the thirteenth century, the territory of Euskadi got annexed to the Kingdom of Castilla. 
Nonetheless, the three territories – Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya – maintained their own 
legal system, and these foral rights guaranteed administrative, military and fiscal autonomy. 
This system remained largely unaltered until the end of the nineteenth century. Due to the 
                                                 
13 Tax autonomy is actually given to the three provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) that then finance the region. 
The regional government only coordinates the administrative functions. 
14 Even among the CCAA under the common regime, there are quite some differences in their fiscal treatment, but these 
are not of first order. 
15 Economic arrangement and agreement respectively. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 10 
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need of closer economic cooperation between Spain, PV and the Spanish colonies, foral 
prerogatives became a rather awkward barrier to free trade.
 16 With the support of both 
Spanish and Basque liberals, the 1869 Constitution made some first steps in reducing the 
foral rights. By 1876, they were definitively abolished and only the specific fiscal regime 
was kept in place. This was the start of the so-called sistema de concierto between PV and 
the central government (Zubiri, 2000). Under this regime, the provinces of Alava, Vizcaya e 
Guipuzcoa have the right to collect their own taxes, but need to contribute to the Spanish 
budget in equal form as other Spanish provinces for the costs the central government has in 
the PV. This contribution, also called the cupo or quota, is basically a payment for the costs 
the central government has in delivering some common services to the PV (defence, foreign 
affairs, etc).
17 The idea is that the cupo could be revised every five years. 
 
These principles have been guiding all negotiations since, under all political changes the 
country has known. The first agreement was signed in 1878, and followed by revisions in 
1887, 1894, 1906 and 1925. The 1931 Statute of Autonomy of Euskadi should have 
abolished the system of the Concierto in favour of a brand new model guaranteeing total 
fiscal and financial autonomy to PV. Yet, the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship blocked 
the 1931 Statute, which recognized the autonomy of provinces and municipalities.
18 The 
return to democracy, following Franco’s death and the period of Transición, re-established 
fiscal and financial autonomy with the 1978 Constitution, along with the Statute of 
Autonomy for PV, approved in 1979.
19 Articles 40 and 41 of this Statute introduce the legal 
base for the introduction of the foral system of the Concierto Economico.
20 The first organic 
law under this economic agreement between the central government and PV was approved 
in 1981, and followed in its main principles the agreements set up in 1876 (Lémbarri, 
1995). The most relevant difference is that the three territories composing PV were not to 
be treated separately anymore, but as a unique political and administrative subject, hence 
reducing the number of agreements from three to one. 
 
                                                 
16 PV was de facto a free-tax zone with custom rights on the Basque-Spanish border. 
17 The system is a bit more complicated as the cupo is a net compensation, after accounting for some tax income the 
central government has received on the few taxes the region does not collect and some other receipts. For more details, 
see Zubiri (2000). 
18 Franco abolished the system of Concierto for the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, which did not join his coup 
against the Republic, though maintaining these rights – all along his dictatorship – for Alava. 
19 Also known as Statute of Gernika. 
20 “Para el adecuado ejercicio y financiacion se sus competencias, el Pais Vasco dispondrà de su propria Hacienda 
Autonoma.” (article 40) Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 11 
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After a long and complex negotiation process, the Concierto’s revision in 2001 addressed 
some innovations to tackle problems that had arisen since 1981 (Atxabal Rada and 
Muguruza Arrese, 2006).
21 First, PV had been accused by other Spanish regions and trade 
unions of unfair tax competition, especially for attracting firms to locate in the region. Even 
if the regional government has the power to adjust the corporate tax base and rates, attempts 
to implement tax reductions have been blocked by legal courtsuites at the Basque Supreme 
Court, the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The 
opponents argue that this creates harmful competition within the common Spanish and 
European market, and could be considered state aid.
22 Second, the financing system of the 
common regions has been extended substantially, and modified substantially the taxing 
powers of these regions. Finally, European Monetary Union required some fiscal rule to 
restrain public debt. Although the Stability and Growth Pact applies at country level, debt 
control is required also at regional level. 
 
The 2001 law – approved by the Spanish Parliament in 2002 (law no. 12/2002) – details the 
application of the different taxes, but its main innovation lies in regulating the financial 
relations between PV and the central government. An important part of the agreement is the 
respect for solidarity in the terms envisaged in the Constitution and the Autonomy Statute. 
The agreement also foresees a closer coordination and collaboration with the central 
government on questions of budget stability. The third chapter of law 12/2002 installs a 
Commission of the Economic Agreement, with equal representation of PV (one delegate for 
each of the three foral councils, and three for the regional government) and the central 
government, which is meant to decide on the modifications to be made to the agreement and 
the methodology of the quota. This Commission takes taken decisions by unanimity. The 
Law installs two further institutions. The Coordination and Evaluation Commission is 
responsible for adjusting the tax regulations prior to their publication. An Arbitration Board 
– consisting of experts with recognised prestige in tax matters, and appointed for six years 
by the Spanish Treasury and the Basque Treasury – is responsible for resolving any 
conflicts between the State and the Basque administration. 
 
                                                 
21 Minor reforms since 1981 are mainly related to changes in the tax system, like the introduction of VAT in 1986. 
22 The European Court of Justice in its 2010 sentence ruled (cases C-428/06 through C-434/06) that PV might use its 
autonomous right to set taxes since its Statute stipulates tax autonomy, at least if this does not involve any compensation 
from other regions or the central government to offset the loss in tax revenues. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 12 
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The 2007 revision – formalised on October 25
th by law 28/2007 – guarantees PV the full 
power over personal and corporate taxes, and administrative control over VAT, indirect and 
excise taxes. In addition, it renewed the five year quota, while introducing some minor 
revisions due to the need of adaptation to the budget stability rules set by the EU. Also, an 
agreement was finally reached on the composition of the Arbitration Board. 
 
3. Fiscal federalism 
 
3.1. Autonomous decisions on spending and taxes 
 
Fiscal federalism is concerned with understanding which functions and instruments are 
best decentralized, and which are best placed at the central level. The traditional theory of 
fiscal federalism argues that the provision of public goods locally promotes allocative 
efficiency by tailoring public spending better to local needs (Oates, 1972). Decentralisation 
introduces competition across jurisdictions such that mobile citizens vote with their feet to 
get the best public services at the lowest cost (Tiebout, 1956).
23 Hence, even with a 
uniformly applied decentralisation, different local needs would require different levels of 
responsibilities.  
 
Regional government spending amounts to 30 per cent of total government spending in 
Italy and Spain (Table 1).
24 But the fiscal system is asymmetric as their special statute 
gives VdA and PV much more spending power than fellow regions (Garcia-Milà and 
McGuire, 2007). Ordinary Italian regions on average spend 3900€ per head. In contrast, 
VdA spends around three times as much (12465€). For PV, nearly all government 
functions not related to defence or foreign affairs have been transferred. Other CCAA have 
much less spending responsibilities than PV. Nonetheless, the difference between PV and 
other regions in terms of spending per capita is much less outspoken than in Italy. While 
the Basque people receive regional public services for about 5600€, other regions can 
spend 4446€ per citizen on average. The reason for this small difference is that many of the 
                                                 
23 More democratic choices on spending contribute to the accountability of government. Local government can 
experiment with public management, and other governments can learn from this experience (Oates, 1999). As the region 
is motivated to get its own revenues, tax autonomy moreover reorients government spending towards stimulating 
economic activity. These effects likely reduce tax pressure, also because budget management improves when citizens 
become aware of the costs of publicly funded activities (Blöchliger and Petzold, 2009). 
24 If we include spending by local government, this number is much higher in Spain. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 13 
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‘high spender’ regions in Spain, like Andalucia, Cataluña or Galicia, have a similar degree 
of spending autonomy as PV.
25 
 
Table 1. Spending, all functions, average 1995 – 2005. 
share of regional spending in  
general government spending  spending in euros per inhabitant 
Italy  Spain  Italy, ordinary regions  Spain, CCAA 
20.0%   32.2%   3900  4446 
(29.6%) (45%)  VdA  PV 
   12465  5601 
Note: data in brackets include local government; source: OECD National Accounts and Ambrosanio et al. (2008). 
 
The differences between VdA and PV, and the other regions is more outspoken on the 
revenue side. Regional governments rely either on tax revenues or grants to finance their 
public spending. The mix of subnational financing with taxes and grants is very different 
across countries (Joumard, 2005). Table 2 compares the financing that an average region in 
Spain or Italy gets via grants or taxes in percentage of total regional revenues. There is a 
fifty/fifty split in Italy, whereas there is a slight prevalence of tax financing in Spain. After 
the 2009 reform of the Common Regime in Spain, tax financing has become even more 
important.
26 We see that both VdA and PV have a very different financing source than 
other regions. Tax revenues account for not less than 95 per cent of total income, and 
grants have only a minor role to play. In addition to the nine tenths of tax revenues that 
VdA obtains,
27 there are also some minor tax categories – such as the levies on lotteries, 
electricity consumption, spirits and fuels, etc. – that the region receives, either for nine 
tenths or for the total amount. Grants cover a minor part of the costs of functioning of the 
local government. Given that PV collects all tax revenues and subsequently pays the 
central government the yearly cupo for delivered services, tax autonomy is nearly 
complete. The grants cover just some specific minor budget items the central government 
owes to PV. 
 
Table 2. Revenue structure of regional government, as % of total regional revenue, 2005 
  VdA Italy  PV Spain 
Taxes  95 48 97  59.1 
Grants  5 52 3  40.9 
Source: OECD Fiscal Relations Network, Valle d'Aosta budget and Informe Integrado de la Hacienda Vasca (2008). 
                                                 
25 Alternative summary measures of regional power are the various indices developed by Hooghe et al. (2008). Their 
index of fiscal autonomy shows that VdA and PV have about as much control over policy matters as other CCAA, but 
only fiscal autonomy is stronger. 
26 Defined by State law 22 of December 18
th, 2009 
27 This will become 100% once the new regime is formalized. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 14 
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3.2. Limits to autonomy 
 
The efficiency gains from spending and tax autonomy have to be weighted against its 
costs. First, there are economies of scale in providing public services at national scale. 
Second, regional tax or spending decisions can be distorted for several reasons. Granting a 
few specific taxes may create a distortion if regions overstimulate specific activities. Local 
tax decisions also create a trade-off with the tax decisions of other regions. If spending or 
tax changes affect other regions, local governments may not internalise the effect of local 
decisions on other territories. Hence, local provision of public goods will be sub-optimal. 
Or taxes may be set lower than in neighbouring regions to attract firms, causing the 
corporate tax to be suboptimally low. Third, as tax raising capacity is unevenly distributed 
across jurisdictions, decentralisation raises concerns of equity.
28 For these reasons, the 
constitution usually delimits the spending or tax competences of lower government tiers. 
 
Limits on spending autonomy 
 
Spending autonomy does not imply unlimited freedom to legislate in certain areas. 
Spending has to correspond to certain criteria that are homogenous on the national territory 
to avoid large disparities in the quality of public services. The stronger are economic or 
political linkages across a country’s regions, the less flexibility is allowed in differentiating 
regional budgets.
29 Looking at regional spending power based on simple expenditure 
shares may therefore be misleading. No internationally comparable indicators of the extent 
of these limitations on regional spending discretion are currently available, as it requires a 
detailed knowledge of the institutional and regulatory background of each policy area. 
Recent studies have attempted to make some headway in classifying regional budgeting 
practices (Bach et al., 2009). This classification does not fully capture the differentiation in 
spending powers we observe in Spain or Italy. A simple comparison of the tasks attributed 
to ordinary and special regions undeniably shows that VdA and PV are responsible for 
many more competences (Brosio and Revelli, 2000; Zubiri, 2000). But legislative control 
from Rome or Madrid on these decisions is still important. The central government keeps 
                                                 
28 Next to concerns about the volatility of local tax revenues, and the efficiency of tax collection. 
29 This overlap of responsibilities reduces accountability of local budgeting. The central government increasingly 
manages directly the implementation of various policies at local level with earmarked grants. This has resulted in 
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significant regulation powers governing the basic conditions of provision of services, in 
Italy through common standards in education or health and social policies (the so called 
Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza and Livelli Essenziali di Prestazione). In Spain, similar 
standards of equality to social and public services are implicitly assumed in the cost 
calculations prior to the distribution of tax shares. 
 
One numerical indicator of the importance of co-decision by the central government on 
local policies is the level of earmarked transfers to regions (Bach et al., 2009). Some 
transfers are granted automatically, and do not require matching funding or are not 
conditional on some criterion. Earmarked grants are instead attached to a specific task, and 
aim at securing minimum standards in public services, and avoid a too low spending on 
public goods with positive spillover effects.
30 These earmarked grants may require a 
matching level of spending by the region. Table 3 shows that in Italy and Spain, most 
grants are unconditional. These non-earmarked grants are mainly mandatory transfers by 
the central government. As they are general purpose grants, they provide quite some 
freedom of use (Blöchliger and King, 2006; Blöchliger and Rabesona, 2009). Block grants 
or discretionary grants are not used in Italy and Spain. Of the fewer earmarked grants, most 
are decided at the discretion of the central government, but regions need not provide a 
matching level of spending.
31 Fiscal decentralisation seems to have mainly transferred 
spending power, with little conditions on its use. In contrast, the few grants to VdA are 
earmarked, and mainly concern investment in infrastructure and the shared participation in 
some public entities. For PV, grants mostly go towards specific budgets that have been 
detailed in the Concierto Economico. 
 
Table 3. Grant revenue of regional governments, as % of total revenue, 2005 
    VdA Italy PV  Spain 
total  grants    5.0 51.7 3.0 44.1 
earmarked total    15.4    7.8 
 mandatory,  matching  5.0  2.3  0.3 
 mandatory,  non-matching    2.6  3.0  5.7 
  discretionary,  matching   -   0.9 
 discretionary,  non-matching   10.5   0.9 
non  earmarked  total   36.3  36.3 
  mandatory, general purpose    36.3    36.3 
  mandatory,  block   -  - 
  discretionary   -  - 
Source: Blöchliger and Rabesona (2009), Valle d'Aosta budget and Informe Integrado De La Hacienda Vasca (2008). 
                                                 
30 Both types of grants can either be mandatory or at the discretion of the central government. 
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Limits on tax autonomy 
 
Whereas regional spending decisions are hardly subject to central control, there are more 
limitations in the tax system. Traditional measures like regional taxes as a percentage of 
total revenues overstate the effective revenue raising powers of regions. The first reason is 
that regions share a large part of tax revenues with other governments. Total tax income is 
divided (vertically) between the central and regional governments. This tax sharing limits 
the discretion of the region in deciding on tax rates and bases. Regions sometimes have a 
strong say in the set up of these schemes as the distribution scheme is often a constitutional 
agreement that often requires supermajorities to change. Often, regions may collectively 
negotiate the sharing formula with the central government. But in a few cases, the central 
government can decide unilaterally to change tax rates, and even to abolish existing taxes. 
Moreover, tax sharing arrangements have become popular as a means to redistribute 
resources (horizontally) across regions. Political bickering on the distribution of these tax 
revenues have turned tax sharing into complex calculations to determine what a region 
generates, and what it eventually receives out of the common pool of tax resources. These 
adaptations often break the direct link between the generated tax revenue and what the 
region eventually obtains (Blöchliger and Petzold, 2009).
32 The final reason is that even 
the autonomy to decide on regional taxes is often constrained in introducing (or abolishing) 
taxes, setting tax rates, defining new tax bases, or granting tax credits to individuals or 




Few synthetic indicators exist to measure the true competence over taxes. Recent work of 
the OECD has started to classify these different types of revenues, and distinguishes three 
main categories (Blöchliger and Rabesona, 2009): grants, shared tax revenues and 
autonomous taxes. These categories can each be refined by the regional degree of 
discretion. In case of taxes, this is the authority to change tax rates or to grant tax reliefs. In 
tax sharing agreements, the split of total revenues between the central government and 
among regions can be negotiated between regions, require regional approval, or can 
                                                 
32 This has made it quite difficult to draw a clear distinction between grants and shared tax revenues. Tax sharing systems 
have nonetheless become the most popular means of financing regional government. They provide stable fiscal resources 
while maintaining central control over fiscal aggregates and contributing to fiscal equalisation. This guarantee on 
sustainability is strengthened as the taxes usually cover major categories (like income, VAT or corporate taxes) with a 
high and stable yield. 
33 Lower taxes on households are less common, probably because they are less mobile (Joumard, 2005). Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 17 
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otherwise be decided by the central government on the basis of some fixed formula that 
can be negotiated (for a period of years). Table 4 reports the proportion of these three main 
types of revenues for an average region in Italy and Spain. We follow the method of 









Table 4. Revenue structure of regional government, as % of total revenue, 2005 
    VdA Italy  PV Spain 
total -  28.4  88.0  32.7 
discretion on rates and reliefs    -    32.6 
discretion on rates    28.4    0.1 
autonomous taxes 
  
discretion on reliefs    -    - 
total 88.0  19.9  4.0  23.3 
revenue split set by region    -    - 
revenue split set with region consent  88.0  11.4    23.3 
revenue split set by central 
government plurianual   8.5  94.0  - 
tax sharing 
revenue split set by central 
government annual   -  - 
other taxes  total 7.0  -  5.0  0.0 
total  5.0 51.7 3.0 44.1 
earmarked 5.0  14.8    7.0  grants 
non earmarked    36.9  3.0  37.1 
Source: OECD Fiscal Relations Network, Valle d'Aosta budget and Informe Integrado De La Hacienda Vasca (2008). 
 
Table 4 shows that the structure of tax financing is quite similar in Italy and Spain: about 
half of regional financing comes from grants, and own taxes account for about 30 per cent 
of regional income. Shared taxes finance the remaining 20 per cent of regional budgets.
34 
Table 2 may have given the impression that VdA and PV can freely use tax resources to 
finance public spending. Table 4 shows that in practice, both regions may find it actually 
quite difficult to adjust their revenues. 
                                                 
34 With the latest reform of the common regime in Spain, this share has risen to about 50 per cent of total revenue. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 18 
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The financing arrangement for VdA deviates substantially from the general system in Italy. 
VdA does not have own taxes, as nearly all taxes are shared between VdA and the central 
government. Ordinary regions seem to have more autonomy. However, this difference 
should not be overrated since the Constitutional Court has ruled that the own taxes in 
ordinary regions can only be levied on tax bases the central government is not taxing 
already. Given the extent of the Italian tax system, this makes it practically impossible to 
introduce regional taxes. Ordinary regions are somewhat better positioned in their 
negotiations on the tax sharing agreement. Although the national government can decide to 
suppress some taxes, co-decision is foreseen for only half of all shared tax revenues, so 
ordinary regions have some negotiation power with the treasury by pooling their requests. 
In contrast, given its particular statute, VdA stands alone in defending its arrangement, and 
has hardly any political power to modify the agreement. 
Tax autonomy is certainly stronger for PV. Autonomous taxes are the major source of 
income, and shared taxes represent only a minor part of revenues.
35 Although for historical 
reasons, PV negotiates its particular system separately with the central government, this 
puts it actually in a very strong position. The first reason is that its political representation 
at national level is very strong, as Basque parties are crucial for government majorities in 
the Cortes. Second, separate negotiations do not dilute the claims of PV by similar calls 
from other regions. Nonetheless, these numbers do not take into account additional 
legislative limits. In fact, there is a clause in the Law on Autonomous Financing that 
stipulates a limit on the overall tax pressure: a region’s tax level shall not deviate from the 
average pressure in Spain. This rule is not clearly specified as it refers to the average tax 
pressure, and not to any specific tax, and it does not specify what a deviation is. This 
clause has been invoked by the central government and CCAA governments to dispute the 
tax cuts the PV planned on businesses. Hence, even if there is quite a lot of potential 
freedom in deciding on tax rates and tax bases, this clause potentially restricts changes in 
taxation. 
Limited borrowing autonomy 
When regions lack the responsibility for using their own tax revenues, but keep substantial 
spending autonomy, they are prone to fiscal profligacy. Taxpayers’ money from other 
regions comes in more cheaply than taxing the own citizens to finance a given level of 
                                                 
35 In Spain, autonomous taxes are more important in total revenues of the CCAA than shared taxes. And the financing 
system grants quite some freedom as on nearly all own taxes, regions can decide on changes in the tax rates, or may grant 
reliefs. Even changes to shared tax revenues require prior approval from the regions. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 19 
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spending. So regional governments with little tax responsibility will tend to overspend or 
undertax if they realise the differences will be made up for with grants (Inman, 2003). This 
can put in danger fiscal sustainability, and in extreme cases, may even entail explicit bail 
out.
36 This problem of soft budget constraints is exacerbated if the central government is 
weak in its commitment not to intervene, for example, if the central government is hostage 
of regional interests, or if the political and economic spillover of debt default is so large as 
to have consequences on a national scale (Rodden et al., 2003).
37 
 
A good summary indicator of a potential debt problem is given by the vertical fiscal 
imbalance, which is the gap between regional spending and own tax revenues (usually 
expressed as a ratio of transfers to total subnational government revenue). We have 
computed similar indices of vertical imbalance for VdA and PV from the tax and spending 
shares in Table 4. Given the predominance of grants and shared tax arrangements in both 




Table 5. Vertical fiscal imbalance. 
VdA Italy  PV  Spain 
0.86 0.72  0.11  0.68 
Note: average period 1995-2005, own calculations. 
 
The dependence on tax sharing gives VdA much less autonomy, even in comparison to 
other Italian regions, and seems to justify a tight control on public finances in VdA. But in 
contrast, PV certainly has an acceptable degree of tax autonomy in order not to run up debt 
in the absence of such controls. Rating agencies, like Standard and Poor’s or Fitch, which 
assess the fiscal capacity of sovereigns, qualify both VdA and PV at a similarly high level. 
The ratings attributed to both regions follow closely those at country level (Table 6). The 
first reason is that debt is actually quite low in both regions (Figure 1). Despite a jump in 
2001, the debt to GDP ratio does not raise above 20 per cent of regional GDP in VdA.
39 
For PV, debt has been declining over time and is the lowest of all Spanish regions. The 
second reason is that, despite the reduced flexibility in the budget of VdA, and in the 
                                                 
36 There is also empirical evidence that deficits are much larger when regions are free to borrow, and are dependent on 
grants for financing (Singh and Plekhanov, 2005). 
37 Moreover, if regions have precisely stipulated tasks on which it is difficult to renege, then spending cannot easily be 
cut either. It is even more difficult for the central government to deny a bailout in this case (Rodden et al., 2003). 
38 Large increases in tax autonomy have alleviated this problem in Spain since the 2009 reform. Reform of the fiscal 
system in Italy has met with much political resistance, and little has changed in recent years. 
39 Due to the acquisition of the local hydroelectric power plants. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 20 
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unlikely case of problems with debt payments, rating agencies expect that the central 
government would intervene in case of financial trouble, and would not leave VdA or PV 
to resolve these problems on its own. Subnational credit ratings reflect the expectation that 
the central government backs the debt of the subnational governments as credit risk is 




Table 6. Ratings Standard and Poor's. 
  VdA Italy  PV Spain 
1998 A+  AA  A+  AA 
2000  AA AA AA AA+ 
2007 A+  AA-  AAA AAA 
2009  A+ A+ AAA  AA+ 
              















Source: regional government of Aosta, Statistical Bulletin Bank of Italy (Supplement), OECD 
 
Out of fear of unsustainable regional debt, federal fiscal systems are usually complemented 
with control systems on the sustainability of public finances at lower tiers. There are 
implicit constraints placed on regional budget autonomy by reducing the recourse to debt 
finance. These rules are either numerical or procedural. The former set targets for budget 
balance, debt, and sometimes limit the increases in spending or the tax burden. The latter Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 21 
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rather set the rules of the budgeting process and create a framework for budget monitoring, 
sanctioning, and possible escape clauses (Sutherland et al., 2005). Control systems 
between the first tier and lower levels of government have been set up in a variety of ways. 
In federal countries, it is more common that the central and regional governments 
cooperate in fiscal councils, and this is also the case in Spain. Other countries explicitly 
limit the regional borrowing capacity (Joumard, 2005). In Italy, a Domestic Stability Pact 
was introduced in 1999, following the start of the European Stability and Growth Pact. The 
Domestic Pact imposes annual constraints on the deficit of every single region, and these 
limits are negotiated directly with the treasury. While initially the aim was to reduce 
deficits, it has now become a tool to correct deviations from budget balance, and to contain 
increases in spending. Debt service cannot exceed 25 per cent of current revenues, and is 
only allowed for capital investments. An escape clause allows more borrowing in the event 
of special conditions. It is not clearly stipulated how deficits have to be corrected over 
time. Only a cooperative solution is mentioned, and in case of EU sanctions against Italy, 
non-complying regions contribute by the size of their deficit. Rules of this kind are 
somewhat looser for VdA, as it may issue bonds up to the total amount of current tax 
revenues on the budget. This corresponds to about 30 per cent of regional GDP. This debt 
can only be used to finance investment, or to buy participation in public-private enterprises 
that exert functions related to local autonomy. Under the recent revision of the Pact, each 
year VdA must agree with the Ministry a three-year spending plan, covering both current 
as capital outlays, that curtails annual spending growth to a maximum of 2 per cent, as in 
other regions.
40 This negotiation is one-sided as in case of disagreement, the stricter rules 
for ordinary regions apply. 
 
In Spain, the Budgetary Stability Law obliges each government to maintain a balanced 
budget. The Law was amended in 2006 to allow deficits in an economic crisis or to finance 
capital expenses (Joumard and Giorno, 2005). This borrowing requires authorisation from 
the Ministry of Finance if annual debt service and repayments exceed 25 per cent of 
current revenues. The same authorisation is required for bond issues or loans in foreign 
currency. Regions that incur a deficit need to present a plan to the Fiscal and Financial 
Policy Council that sets out a return to budget balance. This Council consists of the central 
government Finance and Administration ministries and representatives of all regions. The 
central government can decide on additional limits on borrowing for reasons of 
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macroeconomic policy.
41 PV has to obey to these limits, and as such, has no stronger 
autonomy to plan budget decisions over time.
42 
 
4. Asymmetric federalism: causes and effects 
 
4.1. Net beneficiaries of fiscal federalism 
 
Both VdA and PV are the richest regions in their country as measured by GDP per capita 
(Figure 2). We would therefore expect both regions to be net contributors to the financing 
system, as fiscal arrangements typically redistribute in favour of poorer regions. 
 

















Source: Istat, Eustat. 
 
Table 7 compares the financial flows to regions and ranks the regions by the net flows 
received.
43 We compare the situation before and after including social security transfers. In 
absolute numbers, poorer regions typically receive less money than rich regions. But once 
                                                 
41 In case the region’s deficit causes Spain to breach the Stability and Growth Pact, it only will bear the sanction.  
42 Many regions have sought ways around these borrowing constraints with capital transfers to public companies (Amor 
and Pou, 2004). Although formally prohibited, there has been a proliferation in the debt of public companies controlled 
by the regions in recent years. 
43 The figures presented in Ambrosanio et al. (2008) and Barberan and Uriel (2006) are representative of those in other 
studies. Arachi et al. (2006) or Brosio and Revelli (2003) arrive at even high net benefits for VdA. For PV and Navarra, 
Castells (2000) estimates the net benefits to be of a similar order. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 23 
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social security transfers are included, rich regions become net payers into the system while 
poorer regions are net receivers. According to calculations by Barberan and Uriel (2006) 
for Spain, and Ambrosanio et al. (2008) for Italy, the top and bottom part of the ranking 
correspond to the poorest and richest regions. The correlation between the net flows and 
GDP per capita is negative. But surprisingly, VdA still receives net around 890 euros per 
inhabitant once we take into account social security flows. Likewise, PV receives net 792 
euros. Hence, both receive relatively more than their GDP would suggest.
44 They show 
some solidarity with other regions, but mainly through social security transfers. The 
outcome of the fiscal arrangement still results in a net benefit for both regions. Financial 
resources per inhabitant are actually above those of similar regions. 
 
Table 7. Net benefits of financing system, net fiscal flows per capita, in euro 
 net  flows  flows without 
social security   net  flows  flows without 
social security 
Calabria 2817  2059  Melilla  3394  3711 
Sicilia 2661  2277  Ceuta  2970  3240 
Molise 2510  2682  Extremadura  2375  2013 
Sardegna 2361  3076  Asturias  2148  1268 
Basilicata 2313  2370  Canarias  1544  2056 
Campania 2311  2223  Castilla  La  Mancha  1528  1500 
Puglia 2056  2431  Galicia  1422  1080 
Umbria 1785  4088  Andalucia  1421  1237 
Abruzzo  1394  3425  Castilla y Leon  1420  1160 
Liguria 1386  5180  Murcia  860  959 
Valle d'Aosta  890  6120  País Vasco  792  1050 
Marche 146  4299  Cantabria  674  427 
Italy 0  4666  Navarra 584  1207 
Toscana -160  5061  Aragon  346  485 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia  -212  5394  Spain 297  482 
Trentino Alto Adige  -388  5746  La Rioja  232  425 
Piemonte -469  5225  Com.  Valenciana  -37  195 
Lazio -737  5693  Baleares  -915  -368 
Emilia-Romagna -1751 6068  Cataluña  -1094 -643 
Veneto -1836  5128  Madrid  -2302  -1256 
Lombardia -3653  6696       
Source: Ambrosanio et al. (2008), Barberan and Uriel (2006). 
 
                                                 
44 The correlation between GDP per capita and net flows is -0.86 in Italy, and -0.77 in Spain. Other Spanish regions with 
a special statute (Navarra) also deviate from this norm. If all regions had a foral regime with a similar degree of 
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4.2. A preferential treatment to prevent secession 
 
It is often argued that an asymmetry in federal systems just reflects a different culture, 
history and language (Keating, 1998; Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 2007). Recent theories of 
fiscal federalism instead see current outcomes as the consequence of political bickering 
and economic forces (Besley and Coate, 2003; Lockwood, 2006).
45 Following this line of 
research, we argue that the preferential system is the result of political negotiation between 
a central government and some rich regions that may want to break away from the country. 
 
The key to understand this preferential treatment is the difficulty for the central 
government in Rome and Madrid to develop a fiscal arrangement that fully develops fiscal 
autonomy for the entire country (Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 2007; Ambrosanio and 
Bordignon, 2008). Despite the partial devolution of spending and tax powers, the system is 
overall characterised by tight controls on tax autonomy and the issuance of public debt. 
Although both VdA and PV receive close to 100 per cent of all tax revenues, the de facto 
autonomy to decide on tax revenues and the budget – as in other regions – is quite limited 
in practice. 
 
Limits on fiscal power may be necessary to equalize fiscal capacity and control the 
sustainability of public finances across the country. However, such rules are not adequate 
for VdA or PV that could afford lower taxes or higher levels of public spending without 
incurring higher debt. Tax competition would allow both regions to attract firms and 
citizens with lower taxes or better public services. More spending autonomy would allow 
tailoring the provision of public goods to local needs. Full autonomy would allow realising 
the benefits of fiscal federalism. VdA and PV would stand to gain economically from more 
autonomy. As the fiscal system does not allow for this flexibility, the net transfers to VdA 
or PV partially correct the built-in equalisation of the system. The preferential treatment 
compensates both regions for the lack of fiscal federalism in the current arrangement, and 
so prevents calls for more fiscal autonomy, or even outright secession (Bolton and Roland, 
1997; Le Breton and Weber, 2003). 
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4.3. Tiny, happy and affluent regions: a political equilibrium 
 
Asymmetric federalism is a compromise between the difficulties to implement fiscal 
federalism in the entire country, due to economic and institutional differences, and the 
necessity for some regions to develop real tax and spending powers. The preferential 
treatment reflects a mutual understanding between the regional and central government. 
Aggressive tax competition by VdA or PV could be considered as compromising co-
operation in a number of other policy areas. More intense tax competition would certainly 
create a debate on the negative consequences of horizontal tax competition between 
regions. It would exacerbate demands by other rich regions to be treated in a similarly 
favourable way. In contrast, poorer regions could start to demand more fiscal equalisation. 
Competition would also spark fear in these regions of not being able to provide a sufficient 
level of public services, despite the existence of common standards. As long as tax 
competition is limited, other regions and the central government will not start questioning 
the especially generous sharing agreement for VdA and PV. The threat to break away from 
the country is strong enough to counterbalance the claims of the central government and 
the other regions. The political negotiation power of these regions is therefore shaping the 
current situation and is crucial to understand steps to obtain more autonomy.  
 
This threat does not seem too relevant for VdA. However, historically, VdA has shown 
strong tendencies to separate from Italy. The independentist movement has been 
particularly relevant in local politics at the end of the Second World War. In 1946, the 
newly installed regional Council was strongly divided between a pro-Italian group 
(favouring autonomy within Italy) and a separatist group in favour of annexation to France 
or of an independent state. This even resulted in a call to the United Nations for an 
‘international guarantee towards the realization of a referendum’ by which the local 
population could choose between the ‘existing status quo or the creation of an independent 
State’. Violent clashes between the two factions continued until the Italian institutional 
referendum and elections for the Constitutional Assembly in 1946 (Zanotto, 1986). The 
pro-Italian factions that subsequently won the elections then started negotiating the 
creation of the Autonomous region (Riccarand, 2004), yet the confrontation with the 
separatists continued until the approval of a Special Statute in 1948. The separatist 
movement has lost political power over time, and nowadays has nearly disappeared. The Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 26 
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generous financial regime has progressively reduced the anti-Italian sentiment within the 
local population, and has been considered a lever for reaching economic prosperity. 
 
At present, and because of its small economic size, and its diminished political power, the 
VdA government may be reluctant to enter in disputes with the central government, which 
can simply undo any gain in autonomy with a marginal adjustment in tax bases or rates. 
The losses in tax revenues of this vertical tax competition probably outweigh the gains in 
the short term of more tax autonomy (Joumard, 2005). Moreover, local politicians are 
probably not unhappy with the generous revenues from the sharing of national taxes 
collected on their territory. As VdA does not need to contribute to equalisation transfers 
destined to poorer regions, it eventually obtains a much higher income from these tax 
shares, and any additional transfers (Bibbee, 2007). The local government probably 
considers this more than sufficient to continue with a high level of public spending, rather 
than cutting taxes. Regional politicians may have been happy to spend generous tax 
resources to buy political consensus at home. Voters may be happy too with a high level of 
public services. This positive attitude towards the current fiscal arrangement is shown also 
by the continuous requests raised by the regional government itself to continue the current 
system even in the case of the application of the foreseen federal reform. VdA is happy 
with maintaining the status quo. 
 
The political situation in PV is very different from VdA. The region has been striving for 
independence for a long time, and has been governed till at least 2009 by nationalist 
parties. Terrorist groups claim to fight for independence, and the actions of ETA continue 
to dominate Spanish politics. Since the Gernika Statute of 1979, calls for independence 
have been frequent, not just in PV. The use of its fiscal power has been a constant point of 
conflict in the negotiations of the Concierto Economico. Given the fast developments after 
the democratic transition, PV initially adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude to improve its 
negotiating position with other regions and the central government (Garcia-Mila et al., 
2000; Zubiri, 2000). Unilateral changes may have risked putting off other regions at 
granting additional competences. So reform may not have been on the cards directly. 
However, the Basque government has persistently tried to extend its fiscal power since. In 
contrast to VdA, the control system on fiscal policy is considered by PV as a straightjacket 
on its fiscal choices. The repeated attempts of the Basque government to attract businesses 
to PV have been disputed in several legal courtsuites at the Basque Supreme Court, the Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 27 
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Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This has resulted in 
a reform of the Concierto Economico that has created specific arbitrage boards to settle 
conflicts, and set out the future revisions of the Concierto. More intense tax competition 
has started to exacerbate demands by other rich regions, especially Catalonia, to be treated 
in a similarly favourable way. This has culminated in the 2009 reform of autonomous 
financing that has substantially increased tax autonomy and reduced the solidarity between 
regions. Unlike Italy, poorer regions in Spain do not have the political clout to contrast the 
pivotal position of Basque parties in the Cortes. 
 
PV can and does use its political weight at national level to push through changes. The 
political representation at the national level gives rise to bargaining and log-rolling that 
affects the set up of central financial arrangements. In recent years, political parties of PV 
have not hesitated to use their negotiating power to get additional financing. They have 
often become determining for the survival of the central government in the Cortes. This 
has made Basque politicians’ negotiating power punch above their minor representation in 
the national parliament (the PV population is about 6 per cent of the total for Spain, which 
results in 22 out of 350 seats in Parliament). This has allowed Basque political parties at 
the time of the 2010 Budget to make the central government pay for additional spending in 
PV, and additionally accept a suspension of current procedures against PV budget at lower 
courts.  
 
4.3. Economic effects of asymmetric federalism 
 
A financing system that devolves spending and tax autonomy might reduce the economic 
distortions of a centralized system. More autonomy would pay off economically with 
better managed public services, improved budget management, a more adequate 
composition of spending, and a reduced tax pressure. Financing of the budget with taxation 
or debt would become more transparent, also easing pressure for the central government to 
control regional debt. These ‘classical’ benefits of fiscal federalism have to be weighed 
against the costs of distorted provision of public goods, a lack of coordination, the effects 
of economic inequality and a whole set of governance problems (Prud’homme, 1995). A 
complete cost-benefit analysis of all aspects of a fiscal arrangement would be required to 
evaluate the effects of the current financing arrangement, but is a too ambitious exercise 
given the various trade-offs. For the same reason, the empirical literature on the economic Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball   2011/01  pàg. 28 
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growth effects of introducing fiscal federalism has probably not come up yet with a 




One reason for the lack of support for positive economic effects is the set up of the fiscal 
system (Rodden et al., 2003). Although devolution implies heterogeneity in the budget and 
economic outcomes in each region; it does not mean asymmetry in decentralisation itself 
(Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2007). An asymmetric financing arrangement creates 
economic inefficiencies in spending and tax choices. The lack of uniformity does create 
some economic tradeoffs that stretch beyond the question of unfair tax competition by the 
privileged regions (Keating, 1998). On the one hand, the economic redistribution, which is 
implicit in the Spanish and Italian fiscal system, is often argued to drain resources from 
rich regions, and put poorer parts of the country on a lifeline that prevents structural reform 
(Obstfeld and Peri, 1998). The reduction in economic inequality between regions is 
excessive as it prevents rich regions from advancing economically, and poor regions to 
catch up with the rich regions. The preferential treatment then makes economic sense if it 
reduces the excess degree of redistribution in Italy and Spain. This is similar to the 
argument of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) that decentralisation curbs the Leviathan state. 
However, the privileges granted to VdA and PV are excessive in compensating their loss 
of autonomy. In both regions, tax and spending levels are inefficiently high, and the level 
of debt is suboptimally low. VdA and PV live from economic rents, just like poorer 
regions often live on the lifeline of transfers. More autonomy would make VdA or PV 
really responsible for their own budget. Asymmetric decentralisation might be difficult to 
sustain for the country as a whole (Blöchliger et al., 2009). Sidepayments to regions in an 
increasingly complex web of overlapping responsibilities and exceptions to tax schemes 
complicates control on fiscal imbalances, and attempts to maintain the homogeneity of 
economic conditions over the country. 
 
Federalism à la carte not only creates economic losses in the short term, but also persistent 
distortions in political decision making. As VdA and PV live from economic rents, this 
creates a political deadlock on possible reforms of the financing system. Reform measures 
in Italy and Spain over the last decade have aimed at matching higher spending autonomy 
with increased taxing power for the ordinary regions and CCAA. It has not brought 
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substantial changes to the special arrangements of VdA and PV. Asymmetric federalism 
risks creating a political stalemate that makes it impossible to set further steps in 
devolution in an economically sensible way (Tanzi, 1995).  
 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Italy and Spain are making gradual steps towards a federal structure. A peculiar feature is 
the asymmetric way in which regional spending competences and tax revenues are defined. 
VdA and PV retain a lot of additional competences, and substantial spending power 
although autonomy is implicitly curtailed via the tax sharing system or debt control. The 
preferential treatment, which makes both VdA and PV net beneficiaries of the fiscal 
system is a compensation for the lack of autonomy and so prevents secession (Le Breton 
and Weber, 2003). 
 
This asymmetric federalism creates quite some economic inefficiencies. Although partial 
equalisation may reduce the negative effects of redistribution, the current situation makes a 
rich region live from economic rents. The differences in political representation at the 
national level give rise to regional bargaining and log-rolling that affects the set up of 
central financial arrangements. Federalism à la carte complicates further steps in 
negotiations as it petrifies positions of net winners and losers of a reform. The tendency to 
avoid net losers in negotiations on reforms of fiscal arrangements exacerbates the problems 
of stability and equity of fiscal federalism.  
 
The key to restoring an efficient federalism in Italy and Spain is an overhaul reform of 
fiscal relations that relies less on hierarchical control but more on granting true spending 
and tax autonomy. A truly federal system would realise the benefits of fiscal federalism in 
all regions (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2007; Bibbee, 2007). Such a reform might also 
relax the pressure to grant privileges to some regions, which may then really compete for 
resources. This might be politically acceptable only if both regions increase solidarity with 
poorer regions.  
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